Ten candidates, backed by 38 parties, are running in this year’s presidential elections in Venezuela [next Sunday, July 28]. However, there is consensus that the race is centered on just two: President Nicolás Maduro and the main opposition bloc, the Democratic Unity Platform (PUD), whose candidate is Edmundo González Urrutia.
All the polls place these two candidates in the lead in the race. But the radical opposition, grouped in the PUD, and the international press, only take into account the polls that indicate González Urrutia’s victory.
Some examples are the Delphos Institute, which claims that the opposition candidate has 59.1% of the votes, compared to Maduro’s 24.6%; Consultores 21, which gives 55% to 60% preference to Urrutia and 25% to 28% to Maduro; Hercon Consultores, which suggests that 68.4% will vote for Urrutia and only 27.3% for Maduro; and ORC Consultores, which indicates that 59.6% of voters support Urrutia and only 12.5% Maduro.
Although these are said to be the most reliable institutes, it is “forgotten” that they are run by people with markedly anti-Chavez political positions, such as Saúl Cabrera of Consultores 21, Oswaldo Ramírez of ORC Consultores, Luis Vicente León of Datanálisis, as well as Benigno Alarcón, director of the Center for Political Studies at UCAB. They have made public statements endorsing the questionable results of their polls, namely, that González Urrutia is the clear favorite against Nicolás Maduro, and that only political machinations using the State apparatus can give the current president victory.
“Polls are being systematically used as a weapon of electoral propaganda to generate a climate of opinion about the possible outcome of the elections,” declared sociologist Juan Manuel Trak to the American agency Voice of America (founded by the CIA). He is absolutely right.
The results of the polls mentioned differ greatly from those published by other institutes, which are not reported by the international media. The Hinterlaces institute, branded as Chavist by the opposition and newspapers, but which has been correct in almost all its predictions in recent years, indicates that Maduro has 54.2% of the votes, compared to 24.1% for Urrutia. Other institutes follow: Data Viva predicts 55.2% of the votes for Maduro and 20.9% for Urrutia; Paramétrica indicates 51.74% for Maduro and 29.06% for Urrutia; and International Consulting Services has recorded 71.6% of voting intention for the current president and 23.9% for his main rival.
Of course, Trak also believes that the polls that indicate a Maduro victory are also biased. It is quite likely. But they are much closer to reality than the dubious polls that favor the opposition. If everyone votes, the 4.2 million members of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) who ratified Maduro’s candidacy in March would already represent 19.6% of the 21.4 million Venezuelans eligible to vote in these elections.
After years of intense political, economic and social crisis caused by the death of Hugo Chavez, the fall in oil prices and the economic war sponsored by the United States, the Venezuelan economy has begun to recover. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study published in April reported a 2.6% growth of Venezuela’s GDP in 2023 and estimated that in 2024 the growth will be 4.2%. Inflation in the first half of this year was 8.9% and in June it fell to 1% according to the Central Bank of Venezuela, the lowest monthly rate in 12 years and the best of the Maduro era. According to the Venezuelan Financial Observatory, which is not linked to the Government, inflation in June was 2.4%. In the previous month, May, inflation of 1.5% was the lowest since 2004.
The businessmen themselves have given the government a respite, which has reached agreements with the private sector to rescue the economy, diversify production and invest in exports. Fedecámaras, famous for leading successive coup attempts between 2002 and 2004, has not publicly embarked on the terrorist discourse of the PUD and the businessmen are not coercing (at least emphatically) their employees to vote for the opposition, as they did before. The US government has resumed dialogue with Caracas, which suggests relaxing external pressure, which could change if Donald Trump is elected.
China and Russia are deeply involved with the Venezuelan government and this is an important pillar of support for Maduro, whose government has been reaping the fruits of this alliance – and of agreements with other countries such as India, Turkey and Iran. Unlike the last crisis in 2019, the two main neighbours (Brazil and Colombia) are now governed by presidents allied to Maduro, making it difficult to destabilise the country at the borders and to support self-exiled radical opposition groups.
One indication of Venezuela’s recovery and stabilization is the fact that the country has ceased to be international news in recent years. The main international media are clearly anti-Chavez and take advantage of any even slightly negative event to carry out a broad propaganda campaign against the government. This has not been possible in recent years.
One important reason is that the opposition has not recovered from its defeat in 2019 with the failure of Juan Guaidó and has not been able to reunite effectively. There are no longer large anti-government demonstrations, among other things because the right has not found more opportunities to take to the streets and put pressure on the government.
The radical wing of the opposition, for its part, continues with the same unrealistic discourse of 20 years ago (accusing the government of being a dictatorship, of repression and censorship, and of committing electoral fraud). González Urrutia’s proposals to privatize land, industries, health care, and education are very unpopular, which alienates him from the broad masses of the population. Urrutia himself was a totally unknown politician three months ago and is nothing more than a puppet manipulated by María Corina Machado, the historic opposition leader manufactured in the laboratories of the CIA and scandalously financed by the United States government.
Chavismo, for its part, remains strong and organized, despite its contradictions and dissidents, as does the Communist Party. In addition to the presidency of the Republic, it governs 19 of the 23 states, 213 of the 335 municipalities, has 222 of the 277 deputies in the National Assembly, a majority in 20 of the 23 state legislative assemblies and in 224 of the 335 municipalities. The judiciary and other national public institutions, as well as the high command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces and the police, are generally legalistic.
However, despite a favorable real scenario for the 31st electoral victory in 25 years of Chavismo next Sunday (28), it will probably not be as easy as the polls that favor him indicate. The economic situation is not as bad as before and the country is relatively pacified, but the people continue to live in an unstable social situation. Although he will probably win the elections, his result should indicate that attempts at reconciliation with the opposition, the Venezuelan bourgeoisie and US imperialism are not bringing great political gains to Chavismo in the eyes of its social base, especially the youth.
On the other hand, the radical opposition takes victory for granted, using polls that favour them and denying reality. The international press buys into this discourse. This is a campaign that deliberately sells an illusion and the right will surely use these polls and the biased press coverage as “proof” that there was fraud, if the electoral result is contrary to these predictions, and, taking advantage of this climate, will return to its traditional repertoire of not recognising the victory of Chavismo.
The US government, unlike in all previous elections, decided to be more cautious and not issue statements of support for the opposition. However, a Maduro victory, branded as fraudulent by the opposition and the international press, could lead to a change in the US position on public support for destabilization. After all, a moribund government in transition, such as Joe Biden’s, is unpredictable.